نشرت
صحيفة وول ستريت جورنال الأميركية تقريرا بعنوان "الدولة العميقة تعود في مصر
مرة أخرى"، كشفت فيه عن وجود سيناريو منذ عدة أشهر لعزل الرئيس محمد مرسي خططت له المعارضة والجيش.وأشارت
الصحيفة في تقريرها إلى اجتماع كبار قادة الجيش المصري، بشكل منتظم مع قادة
المعارضة، وقالت إنّ رسالتهم كانت أن الجيش سيتدخل وسيعزل مرسي بشكل قسري إذا
استطاعت المعارضة حشد عدد كافٍ من المتظاهرين في الشوارع.والتالي هو النص لأصلي
باللغة الانجليزية.
In Egypt ,
the ' Deep State ' Rises Again
Meetings Between Generals and Opposition
Leaders Show the Workings of an Assortment of Forces that Wield Tremendous
Influence
By
CHARLES LEVINSON and MATT BRADLEY CONNECT
CAIRO
—In the months before the military ousted President Mohammed Morsi, Egypt 's
top generals met regularly with opposition leaders, often at the Navy Officers'
Club nestled on the Nile .
The
message: If the opposition could put enough protesters in the streets, the
military would step in—and forcibly remove the president.
Reuters
Muslim
Brotherhood members and supporters of ousted president Mohammed Morsi prayed in
Cairo Friday.
"It
was a simple question the opposition put to the military," said Ahmed
Samih, who is close to several opposition attendees. "Will you be with us
again?" The military said it would. Others familiar with the meetings
described them similarly.
By
June 30, millions of Egyptians took to the streets, calling for Mr. Morsi to
go. Three days later, the military unseated him.
Suggestions
that Mr. Morsi's overthrow was planned in advance, as opposed to an emergency
response, have implications for U.S. aid. "If there was evidence this…was
blatantly premeditated, then it would put more pressure to cut off aid on the
[Obama] administration, which is currently trying to avoid having to label this
a coup d'état," said Josh Stacher, a Kent State University political
science professor and Egypt expert.
The
meetings between the generals and opposition leaders also show the workings of
what is known in Egypt as the "deep state"—an assortment of
long-standing political and bureaucratic forces that wield tremendous
influence. A military spokesman, Col. Ahmed Ali, acknowledged that "there
was a process of getting to know people that previously the military had little
dealings with."
An
acme of the Arab Spring uprisings came in 2011 when Egyptians overthrew
dictator Hosni Mubarak. Last year's election of Mr. Morsi, from the
conservative Muslim Brotherhood, suggested Egypt's democratic transition was
moving along nicely, if bumpily. Mr. Morsi's ouster threatens that transition.
The
secret meetings between the military and secular opposition parties were key to
the political chess game leading to Mr. Morsi's departure. The meetings represented
a strange-bedfellows rapprochement between two groups long at odds: Egypt 's
opposition, and the remnants of the Mubarak regime. Their enmity dates to the
30-year dictatorship of Mr. Mubarak, which used its security services to quash
the opposition.
WSJ’s
Jay Solomon says that Egypt ’s recent tumult has left it with no stable middle
between the army and the Muslim Brotherhood – and the U.S. , despite a military
aid package, has little ability to shape the country’s path.
Today,
in a reversal, the opposition and Mubarak-era forces are united. They view Mr.
Morsi and his Islamist ideology as a threat.
"Is
there a danger that June 30 could become a counterrevolution? Yes. But it can
also be a valuable opportunity to reset the transition," said a senior
aide to Amr Moussa, a member of opposition leader Mohamed ElBaradei's National
Salvation Front.
The
meeting of minds between Mubarak-era powers and the secular opposition has
coincided with a resurgence of bare-knuckle political tactics resembling Mubarak-era
violence. In the days before Mr. Morsi's ouster, for instance, a wave of
violence against Muslim Brotherhood offices bore similarities to violence on
behalf of the Mubarak regime during previous elections in the Mubarak era.
It
is difficult to know the attackers' motives with certainty. Within Egypt they
are viewed by many who witnessed the violence as efforts by Mubarak-era power
brokers to push Mr. Morsi out using methods that once sustained Mubarak.
With
Mr. Morsi out, Mubarak-era figures and institutions are gaining influence. The
military chose a Mubarak-era judge as interim president. Other Mubarak-era
judges are set to head efforts to draft a new constitution.
Egypt
's opposition and Mubarak-era officials began to mend ties in November, after Mr.
Morsi issued a constitutional declaration giving himself sweeping powers in
what was widely considered a power grab. Opposition parties united under the
banner of Mr. ElBaradei's National Salvation Front.
Matt
Bradley reports from Cairo on the misgivings some secular Egyptians have about
the military coup that toppled former President Mohammed Morsi and the damage
it has inflicted on the country’s fledgling democratic process.
Mubarak-era
loyalists had long distrusted Mr. ElBaradei. But after Mr. Morsi's declaration,
the ice thawed. Some influential Mubarak-era figures joined Mr. ElBaradei,
including Hany Sarie Eldin, the lawyer for imprisoned steel magnate and Mubarak
regime heavyweight Ahmed Ezz.
Mr.
Eldin's joining "sent a message to powerful businessmen who were skeptical
about the revolution and ElBaradei that they could trust him," said Rabab
al-Mahdi, a political-science professor at American University of Cairo who is
close to NSF leaders.
The
two sides needed each other. Opposition parties had popular credibility, unlike
Mubarak-era officials. Mubarak figures brought deep pockets and influence over
the powerful state bureaucracy.
Some
of these figures "are the ones who continue the methods of the so-called
deep state," said Ms. Mahdi. "They are the ones who know who are the
election thugs, how to hire them," she said. They know "which
public-sector managers have the biggest networks of employees."
As
Mr. Morsi's ouster neared, there were increasing meetings between the military
and opposition. They included Mr. ElBaradei, former presidential candidate and
Arab League chief Mr. Moussa, and another presidential candidate, Hamdeen Sabahy,
according to Ms. Mahdi and Mr. Samih, both close to top NSF members.
Some
meetings took place at the Navy Officers' Club, where the generals said that if
enough Egyptians joined public protests, the military would have little choice
but to intervene, according to several activists close to Mr. ElBaradei and
U.S. officials. "The military's answer was, if enough people come out into
the streets, then it will be exactly like Mubarak," Mr. Samih said.
Since
Mr. Mubarak's ouster, Egypt 's activists have proved woeful at grass roots
organizing outside cities. But in late April a previously little-known group,
Tamarod, separately launched a petition against Mr. Morsi.
Tamarod's
effort took off. Its founders claim they gathered 22 million signatures in less
than eight weeks. The numbers are impossible to verify, but were widely
reported as fact by state and private media, two hotbeds of anti-Muslim
Brotherhood zeal.
In
the town of Zagazig , former Mubarak party lawmaker Lotfy Shehata said he
rallied support for Tamarod using the same political networks that got him
elected under Mr. Mubarak.
As
agitation against the Muslim Brotherhood grew, the Brotherhood formally asked
the Minister of Interior for protection of their offices nationwide. Gen.
Mohammed Ibrahim, Minister of Interior, publicly declined.
Gen.
Ibrahim faced pressure from powerful figures in the former Mubarak camp. On
June 24, Ahmed Shafiq—the last prime minister appointed by Mr. Mubarak and Mr.
Morsi's closest rival for president—said in a television interview that he
warned the general to not show support for the Brotherhood.
"I
told him…the coming days will not be on your side if you do, and these days
will be very soon," Mr. Shafiq said on TV. "They will see black
days," he said, referring to the Brotherhood.
Days
later, Mr. Shafiq's warning materialized. Armed young men began ransacking
Muslim Brotherhood offices nationwide.
In
Zagazig, an hour north of Cairo , armed men showed up outside a Muslim
Brotherhood office the night of June 27, according to neighbors and residents
of the building housing the office. As they approached, the electricity went
out, according to eyewitnesses not affiliated with the Brotherhood. Gunshots
rang out, these witnesses said. Seven Muslim Brotherhood defenders were shot,
one fatally.
The
province's deputy governor, a Muslim Brotherhood member appointed by Mr. Morsi,
called the police chief and ordered him to intervene to prevent violence,
according to local Brotherhood leader Yasser Hag. Mr. Hag said the police chief
said he couldn't help, citing the need to protect 7,000 antigovernment
protesters elsewhere.
The
police declined to comment. In an interview, Mr. Shehata, the former Mubarak
party lawmaker in the area, said police couldn't respond because they were
stretched thin protecting protesters. He said the youths were random mobs and
would be arrested if caught.
Another
building resident, Mohammed Nasser Ammar, who said he opposes the Muslim
Brotherhood, said that as the youths laid siege through the night, he and his neighbors
phoned the police many times. "Each time they would say that they are
coming, but then they don't show up," he said. Other residents gave
similar accounts.
Nationwide
that evening and in the next few days, dozens of Brotherhood offices were hit.
Mr.
Ammar noted the similarities to Mubarak-era political tactics on behalf of
then-ruling-party candidates. "The thugs that used to come out then, and
the events happening during that time, was pretty much the same to this
time," he said.
—Leila
Elmergawi contributed to this article.
Write
to Charles Levinson at charles.levinson@wsj.com and Matt Bradley at
matt.bradley@dowjones.com
A
version of this article appeared July 13, 2013, on page A1 in the U.S. edition
of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: In Egypt, ' Deep State ' Rises
Again.
